This paper explores the politicization of ethnicity in Nepal since 1990. In particular it looks at how ideas of indigeneity have become increasingly powerful, leading to Nepal becoming the first and to date only 
University, Kathmandu, in a series of talks and newspaper articles in 2011.
5 Ethnicity-based federalism proposes differential rights depending on one's ethnic identity, as found in Bosnia, Ethiopia, or Belgium;
identity-based federalism, recommended for Nepal both by the CSRDSP in 2010 and by the HLSRC in 2012, advocates only that federal states or provinces should be named after the group with a historic link to the territory of the province or state. In the 2013 elections for the second CA, the Maoists, along with explicitly Janajati-and Madheshi-based parties, argued for 'identity-based federalism', having retreated from the terms 'ethnic federalism' and 'ethnically based states' which were prominent in their 2008 election manifestos. The important sociological fact, however, was and remains that this distinction between types of federalism was obscure to the vast majority of the population; even most of the political class were either ignorant of it or considered it irrelevant.
6
In the second CA, elected in November 2013 and sitting from January 2014, the balance of power certainly shifted away from both 'ethnic' and 'identity-based' federalism. Both dominant political parties, the NC and the UML, were and are hostile to ethnically named provinces. At the very last minute, in the last two days before the collapse of the first CA, compromises were put forward -that all states should have combined geographic-ethnic names, or even that the names of the states should be left to the new 5 E.g. Hachhethu, Krishna. 2011. 'Sanghiyata: Jatiya ki Loktantrik? ' [Federalism: Ethnic or Democratic?'] , Kantipur, 15 state assemblies themselves to decide -but it was too late for agreement to be reached. 7 The backlash against ideas of 'ethnic' federalism was a large part of the reason, along with a generalized vote against incumbents, why the Maoists did so badly in 2013. The Maoists acknowledged that they had failed to explain their position on federalism and that they lacked a clear policy on the rights and identity of the poor and labouring class of Khas-Arya people, which was the "main reason" for their defeat.
8
Behind these political events lie a series of movements and events and the rise of a new form of assertive ethnicity, which we attempt to describe and analyse in this paper. It is hardly surprising that the dominant groups of the country, since they already had plenty of representation in the existing political parties and institutions, should have been slow to organize politically and slow to try to schematize, operationalize, and concretize particular cultural traditions as a tool of electoral politics. When the dominant culture provides the framework of the national culture, 9 it is to be expected that it would remain largely taken for granted by its bearers, not needing to be asserted or preserved. Nor is it surprising that the overwhelming bulk of scholarly attention has been on minorities and on ethnic identity formation among dominated groups, just as the construction of 'whiteness' only came to be studied long after marked and minority forms of identity had produced many shelves-worth of analysis.
10
7 Jha, Battles, p. 328. 8 In a press conference on 20 th December 2013 (www.nepalnews.com/index.php/politics-archive/28569-ucpn-maccepts-defeat-in-poll-due-mainly-to-ethnic-agenda Page 6 of 36
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The story we tell here is about how, at a politically vital conjuncture when the future shape of the state was at stake, the identity of the dominant groups could no longer be taken for granted or assumed to be a purely private matter. We describe how the Bahuns (Brahmans) and Chhetris (Kshatriyas) of Nepal were shaken out of their complacency by -as they saw it -being classified as 'others' and 'denied identity'. Suddenly they became politically assertive as Bahuns and as Chhetris and began to make claims for cultural and political recognition for the first time.
11
The research on which this paper is based is part of a larger project on changing Bahun and Dalit identities in Western Nepal. Gellner has studied and written about ethnicity in Nepal since the 1980s, when he first came into contact with members of the Newar movement. Adhikari, a UK-based researcher and Co-Investigator of the above-mentioned project, is himself a Bahun, originally from the Pokhara region, which (as will be described below) has a special place in this story. He is not aligned with any political party and is not a member or supporter of any of the organizations described and is not related to any of the people quoted in this paper, despite sharing a surname with one of them. This article, in addition to the written sources cited, is based on in-depth interviews and observation of several events and programmes between 2009 and 2012 in rural Kaski and urban areas, mainly Pokhara and Kathmandu.
These include 18 detailed interviews with key members of the organizations described carried out by Routledge.
11 Technically, the much smaller Thakuri (the 'royal' sub-caste) and Sanyasi (equivalent in status to Chhetri) groups should be included here; for brevity we refer to 'Bahuns and Chhetris' understood to include smaller aligned groups, just as Nepalis themselves frequently refer to them all as 'Chhetri-Bahun' or 'Bahun-Chhetri'. Part of the point of our account here is that, though they do indeed come together as a single bloc under certain circumstances, there are significant differences, cultural, political, and historical, between them as well. alternatively (a more modern usage) as 'Mongolian'. They are sometimes referred to as 'ethnic groups', a colloquial usage that we also follow here, since -though clearly in a more sociological sense all hereditary groups are equally ethnic -in the popular perception, some groups (just as in the West) are more ethnic than others.
<insert Table 1 approximately here> A key change that followed 1990 was that the decennial national censuses began to collect and publish information on the 'caste or ethnic group' of all citizens (in contrast to Indian censuses, which collect this information only for Scheduled Castes as a collective category, without counting individual castes, and for Scheduled Tribes). Before 1990 it was necessary to guess at the size of particular Nepali groups; the nearest proxy was mother tongue, but this was deceptive as so many members of Janajati groups no longer spoke their ancestral language and had adopted Nepali. After 1991 and in each subsequent decennial census the percentage make-up of the country was public knowledge, as shown in committee to re-examine the official list of Janajatis; following field investigations, the committee submitted a report recommending that the list be expanded to 81 groups. However, perhaps because of its timing, the report proved to be controversial. It was shelved, and never published.
In 28 The penultimate and antepenultimate criteria mean that the inclusion of the Newars, the traditional inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley, is controversial (for some Newars, for other Janajatis, and among non-Janajatis).
29 See, e.g., http://www.nefin.org.np/list/Definition-of-Indigenous/5/0/4 (consulted 20/7/14). National Integrity and Ethnic Goodwill' (described further below), that met and submitted protest memorandums (gyāpan patra) to major donor offices and diplomatic missions in Kathmandu.
As background to these various mobilizations, it is important to note that the rise of the Janajati movement coincided with (a) the spread of the internet, (b) mass labour migration from Nepal to India, the Gulf, and Southeast Asia, and (c) the development of sizeable diaspora Nepali populations in Europe, North America, and Australia. All three processes are linked. Activists inside Nepal were and are able to draw considerable and increasing sustenance from international networks. 35 The internet has proved a valuable tool for mobilizing support and spreading activist messages. The anonymity permitted by the internet also means that there is a considerable amount of material, some vitriolic, on-line that has yet to be studied systematically as a source for ethnic interaction.
33 DFID funding for NEFIN ended abruptly in May 2011, following NEFIN's support for a Nepal-wide band (strike) the previous month. Encouraged by steps such as these, Janajati activists had high hopes that the new constitution would institutionalize a strong form of ethnic federalism. They hoped, among other things, (1) that the different states or provinces would be named after the ethnic group whose ancestral home they were; (2) that 51% of seats in the state assembly as well as the position of Chief Minister would be reserved for that group regardless of population size; (3) that the 'home group' would have prior rights (agrādhikar), e.g. preferential access to natural resources within 'their' territory; (4) that everything except currency, foreign affairs and defence would be devolved to the federal states; (5) that states would have the power to tax non-locals at higher rates than locals.
These hopes of ethnic federalism were to be disappointed. By the time the constitutional committees started to do their work 'ethnic' federalism was replaced with 'identity-based' federalism. Of the five demands or aspirations of ethnic activists, only the first, highly symbolic one, remained, and even that proved too controversial for the Bahun and Chhetri activists to accept. This distinction between the two forms was often ignored -many ethnic activists believed deliberately so -by the NC and UML. In 2012 it became clear that alliances were needed as time was running out and a new and federal constitution was -so everyone assumed -likely to be declared. Despite some differences over the question of reservations, the KSN and BSN, along with eleven smaller groups, eventually managed to forge an alliance based on two main points: (1) ethnicity-based federalism is not acceptable, and (2) Bhattarai immediately announced new elections for November 2012, but it was to be another year before they could take place.
Conclusion: "Branded as 'others' and denied identity"
Reflecting on the results of the 2013 election in the Kathmandu Post, well-known writer Prakash A. Raj (a Kathmandu-based Bahun from an elite family) wrote:
It must be recalled that it was [Baburam] Bhattarai who had advocated 'priority rights' for the ethnic groups after which the states were to be named. In fact, in none of the proposed 51 For more details on the protests for and against ethnic identity-based federalism in April and May 2012, see manifesto for the 2013 election proposed 'identity-based federalism' and stated that the "the death of the first CA was due to the inability to dispel the disturbances/roadblocks (gatirodh) related to identitybased federalism." 57 The UML and NC were able to brand this position 'single-ethnicity-federalism' (ekalajātiya-sanghiyatā) and to claim that they stood for 'multiple-identity-based federalism' (bahu-pahicānmā ādhārit sanghiyatā), communal harmony, and the unity of all Nepalis.
58
The five hierarchically ordered macro categories -sacred-thread-wearer, alcohol-drinker (enslavable and non-enslavable), impure, and untouchable --into which dozens of Nepali castes and ethnic groups were classified until the 1950s gave way, under the Panchayat regime, to a period when, officially, all were equal citizens and ascribed identities were supposedly a purely private matter.
Persisting inequalities made this model untenable. What has emerged from dynamic political and cultural processes is a system of (partially overlapping) macro categories that, interestingly, also divides the country into five, though in this case there is no formal hierarchy: Khas-Arya, Janajati, Madheshi, Dalit, and Other (e.g., Muslims, though at times the majority of Muslims also find themselves included under 'Madheshi'). In such a context, it is not surprising that the 'Khas-Arya' group would organize and claim the 
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Speaker so that nothing could be put to a vote. 59 The middle-level explanation-cum-narrative offered by this paper has focused rather on a process of political ethnicity-building over the last 20 years, which was expressed explicitly through the organizations described and less overtly no doubt through many other channels as well. The pressure of Bahun-Chhetri ethnicity led the NC and UML parties to resist any compromise in the final days of the first CA. 
